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CARTER'S PROJECTED "ZERO-BASED" REVIEW 
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: 
IS OUR TAX CODE TO BE 
"BORN AGAIN"? 
L. Hart Wright*t 
The evolution of today's Internal Revenue Code, which began 
with the mere embryo that Congress created in 1913, has absorbed 
over the ensuing sixty-four years more creative energy on the part of 
more co-authors than any other law in history. Despite this unstinted 
expenditure of "blood, sweat, and tears," the resulting document-
were it possessed of human senses-would recognize that, for a 
foreseeable period, its life will be anything but serene. The plight in 
which it would find itself could even be compared to that early 
morning scene observed one hundred years ago by General Custer, 
when hostile forces were massed on every front and would shortly be 
placing his entire command under siege. 
The Code's position differs from Custer's only in that its struggle 
began with preliminary skirmishes, confined to fairly limited fronts. 
The first of these took place last year (the Tax Reform Act of 1976) 
and from it emerged only one truly fundamental change: the struc-
tural alteration and integration of our estate and gift taxes which, 
in aggregate, never yield more than about $5 billion in yearly reve-
nue. That same amount was then lost by the Treasury in conse-
quence of the single most important tax change generated by a sec-
ond skirmish, from which emerged the Tax Reduction and Simplifi-
cation Act of 1977. The standard deduction-available for a quar-
ter of a century to those who would forgo itemizing their non-busi-
ness deductions-was increased by that act to such a point ($3,200 
for married couples, $2,200 for single persons) that only twenty-
three per cent of our taxpayers now will have an immediate interest 
in itemizing. Potentially much more significant are the assaults yet 
to come, directed as they will be at the shape of the Code's other 
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. A.B. 1938, LL.B. 1941, Univer-
sity of Oklahoma; LL.M. 1942, The University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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even more substantial components. During these attacks, one hostile 
force, whose exact make-up will change somewhat as the issues 
change, will be led by our newly elected President. During his pre-
election campaign, President Carter was especially critical of our tax 
system, calling it a "disgrace" and asserting that the "President ought 
to assume the responsibility for complete tax reform." 
While many of the Code's technical provisions will provide points 
of contact during the tax-policy battles now scheduled for President 
Carter's first term, those struggles will center around three central 
problems: (1) the competing roles, under federal revenue mea-
sures, of "price" concepts and "tax" criteria; (2) the possibly escalat-
ing role of the income tax as a welfare program for the poor; and (3) 
its current role, as President Carter puts it, as a "welfare program for 
the rich."1 The overall result of these struggles is of exceptional 
importance. If the proponents of change prevail with respect to each 
of the three facets, and thus as to the whole, by the end of Mr. 
Carter's first term, our tax system also will have been "born again." 
But to re-examine from "scratch" and substantially reshape the 
most complex law civilized man has created will be an awesome 
undertaking. And if the taxpaying public is to understand what is at 
stake and to be able to assess the relative merits of various proposals, 
politicians and the media-in dealing at least with the more impor-
tant problems-must try to tailor their rhetoric to simple truths. This 
short essay, directed to law students, has the narrow objective of 
trying to assist that effort by identifying the general nature and 
dimensions of the three major issues, the different substantive con-
texts out of which each will emerge, the significant though sometimes 
obscured interrelationship of those issues, and the obstacles-now 
almost inherent-to rational wholesale reform responsive to the most 
complex of those issues. 
I. FEDERAL RELIANCE ON "TAX" CRITERIA AND 
"PRICE" CONCEPTS 
Most law students are only too keenly aware that states, with 
respect to a part of the revenue required for a traditional state 
function, completely ignore all "tax" criteria and utilize instead those 
"price" concepts typically employed by our private sector. The 
reference here is, of course, to tuition ( often substantial, and some-
times greater yet at professional school levels), which many states 
require universities to impose to complement state-provided "tax" 
1. Emphasis added. 
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funds. This general practice is not merely an anachronism. Even at 
the federal level where, as to traditional governmental functions, we 
have been committed since 1913 not just to tax support but to 
progressive taxation, there will be substantial controversy during 
President Carter's first term regarding the relative reliance on "price" 
concepts and "tax" criteria. Such an issue becomes peculiarly legiti-
mate, whatever the individual response, whenever the government 
proposes to assume a function of according to individual recipients 
private benefits long provided (allegedly inadequately so) on a price 
basis by the private sector. An alleged or demonstrated need for the 
government to allocate some tax resources to a given societal problem 
does not give rise automatically to the corollary that previously used 
price concepts should be completely displaced. 
The Carter administration will encounter the price-versus-tax 
issue when it asks Congress to adopt a National Health Insurance 
plan, which amounts to nationalization on a more extensive basis of 
another part of the $130 billion spent on health care in 1976 by the 
public and private sectors combined. Here, in contrast to another 
situation to be discussed later in this essay, the price-or-tax issue may 
arise in a context propitious for its rational consideration since, in the 
health care area, the public can both recognize the issue and compre-
hend its dimensions. Illustratively, the tax side of the issue will be 
clearly exemplified by the Kennedy-Corman bill, which provides that 
benefits per person would bear no correlation to the cost each would 
bear. Identical benefits (41.surance coverage) would be provided to 
each family regardless of its size, but half of the total cost (estimated 
at $24.8 billion by 1980) would be covered by general revenues from 
the progressive income tax, with the other half coming from payroll 
taxes divided in such a way that employers would pay the larger 
share. In contrast, several other plans backed by well-entrenched 
sponsors would be less costly to the Treasury, partially because they 
would complement tax support with one or more price components. 
These proposed price components would require the insured to pay a 
specified annual minimum before triggering benefits, or a modest co-
payment-per-item (for example, $X per office visit), or self-or-co-
insurance costs, borne by the insured, which would cover a stated 
proportion of the total medical costs otherwise paid by the plan itself. 
Consideration of the health care issue may be so timed as to 
contribute to rational deliberation. At one point, the opposite ap-
peared to be true, since the House Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman had indicated last January that his committee would not 
deal with National Health Insurance until after it had dealt with 
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proposed reforms of our income tax law and of its stated and effective 
rate structures. In February, however, President Carter announced 
that he had accelerated his scheduled introduction of a health plan; 
now it and his proposed income tax reform may be submitted at 
approximately the same time. This would be a wholesome coinci-
dence since the cumulative impact of all federal taxes should be taken 
into account when Congress fixes the degree of progressivity to be 
reflected in the income tax's rate structure, as its ultimate aim at that 
point should be to fix each income class' appropriate share of the total 
federal tax burden. Burdens in the nature of a mere price should 
and, here, could be ignored. 
Hopefully, an equally rational approach will be taken in resolving 
yet another price-versus-tax issue which Congress now must face. 
This issue-the separate, but now inadequate, funding arrangement 
which raises about $80 billion annually for Social Security-is cur-
rently being re-examined by Congress. 
Appearing in the press with some frequency are statements from 
politicians and commentators alike that are usually predicated on the 
assumption that the Social Security levy is a tax qua tax. On the 
basis of this assumption, the levy's regressiveness and the resulting 
inequity are criticized sharply. The critics also often include the 
regressive Social Security levy in their definition of the total tax 
package to help demonstrate that the total package is, in their opin-
ion, insufficiently progressive. 
I have analyzed elsewhere the argument that this exaction has 
some of the earmarks of a tax, and of a regressive tax at that.2 In a 
nutshell, while it is imposed on wages at a flat or proportional rate of 
11.7 per cent (shared equally by employer and employee), it permits 
no deduction for necessities and excludes from the base amount not 
only all income a covered employee might derive from capital but also 
that portion of his salary or wage exceeding $16,500. 
The exaction, however, possesses one important price characteris-
tic. It is paid during one's working years for, inter alia, a statutory 
right (depending on survival) later to receive personal retirement 
benefits; and, as a given individual's wages increase (within the 
covered range) during his working years, so too do his tax liability 
and his anticipated future benefits. 
But the resemblance of this latter characteristic to a price is not 
intended to suggest that the levy is only a price. While for a given 
2. See Wright, Crisis Ahead: Challenges to America's Tax System, 29 OKLA. 
L. REV. 911, 932 (1976). 
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individual a correlation exists between the amount of tax paid and the 
amount of anticipated benefits, that correlation is designedly imper-
fect. It is subject to a variety of deviations that depend on a variety 
of factors, including a built-in minimum welfare-type benefit.3 Thus, 
in overall effect, the Social Security tax is actually a hybrid, possess-
ing in varying proportions both price and tax characteristics. 
The existing balance between these two components is under 
challenge before a Congress which must deal with the Social 
Security fund's annually recurring deficit and must act to in-
crease the system's annual intake. Some persons will view the 
problem as one of price, arguing for a rate increase on the ground 
that such a measure will tend to preserve among participants (and 
future Congresses) the self-respecting impression that-in contrast to 
welfare programs-participants earned their scheduled benefits. 
Others, in opposition, tend to classify as ordinary government ex-
penditures either all of the relatively modest benefits now provided 
by the plan or that portion of any benefit not responsive to a price 
concept. Not surprisingly, these persons will view the deficit prob-
lem as a "tax" problem and will argue that the requisite revenue 
increase should be extracted by more progressive means. By one 
device or another, they either would tap our general fund, for which 
the progressive income tax is the mainstay, or further increase previ-
ously scheduled increments in the Social Security tax base (as distin-
guished from its rate). 
Modified versions of both these latter courses were proposed by 
the President on May 9, 1977, when he dealt specifically with Social 
Security's financial problems. Under the plan he proposed, the gen-
eral fund would pay for shortfalls in Social Security revenue, but only· 
to the extent a given shortfall is attributable to excessive unemploy-
ment during a recession-such shortfalls being deemed a general 
cost of our economic system, not a specific cost of our retire-
ment arrangement, and hence properly borne by progressive taxes. 
Also, over a transition period, the President's plan would raise the 
now-statutorily-scheduled ceilings on the Social Security tax base. 
Ultimately that base would include the entire wages of all covered 
employees. But the very fact that this enlarged base would be used 
3. To say that there is even an imperfect correlation is not to suggest that, in 
terms of absolute dollar amounts, a given individual's anticipated benefits are actu-
arially responsive to the amount of tax earlier paid in with respect to his wages. For 
one thing, benefits escalate automatically with inflation. Also, even on a relative 
basis, while a given individual's scheduled benefits are larger than average if his 
covered wages (and the tax paid thereon) were larger than average, the benefits do 
not rise in direct proportion to the covered wages. 
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only in calculating the employers' share of the Social Security tax 
stresses further, with devastating clarity and in three separate ways, 
the tax side of the price-versus-tax controversy. 
First, where the employer is engaged in business for profit, the 
deduction of his Social Security tax for income tax purposes obviously 
will pass part of his increased gross cost to the Treasury's general 
fund. Of course, institutional employers not subject to the federal 
income tax-states, municipalities, and exempt private charitable or 
educational institutions--cannot so shift these increased costs. But 
second, whether the employer is subject to or exempt from the fed-
eral tax, our inability to determine precisely the ultimate incidence 
of the employer's own net share of that increased cost also tends, 
from any given employee's perspective, to reduce relatively the 
"price" underpinning of Social Security. We simply do not know 
whether any given employer's net increased cost will be passed on 
to the consumers of his products (through increased prices) or, in 
the case of state and local governments, to their respective taxpayers, 
or to all or only some of the employer's employees (whose future 
wages may be smaller than otherwise would be the case). We know 
only that the proposed enlargement of the wage base will tend, one 
way or another, to prejudice particularly those employers whose ac-
tivities require them to employ an above-average proportion of well-
paid employees. Third, to limit the enlarged base to the employer's 
tax also relatively reduces the price component by not providing for 
increases in future retirement benefits which would have followed 
only for higher bracket employees if ceilings on the base, when 
raised sufficiently to meet the deficit problem, had been spread so 
as to apply also to their allocated and withheld share of the tax. 
Unfortunately, there is great risk that, on three pivotal occasions, 
the public may not actually realize the true dimensions and signifi-
cance of Social Security's price-versus-tax issue. The first such occa-
sion may emerge because Mr. Ullman, the Chairman of the House's 
tax-writing committee, has indicated, most recently on August 22, 
1977, that Congress' immediate response to the President should be 
to buy time, using patchwork hikes in the nature of minor adjust-
ments within the payroll structure itself to solve the, immediate Social 
Security deficit problem. The aim would be to provide Congress, 
in a later session, with a greater "opportunity to fully and carefully 
consider basic, long-term changes that will have far-reaching ef-
fects." Such a delay would mean that the in-depth price-versus-tax 
debate would not actually take place until after Congress has refash-
ioned the principal device we use to achieve progressivity, the in-
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come tax law and its rate structure. Thus, in reshaping that principal 
device, Congress and the public will be wearing blinders; both will 
be ignorant of-and thus forced to disregard-an important fact 
(potential changes in Social Security funding) germane to the ulti-
mate goal of proper overall tax progressivity. 
Further, a risk exists that the income tax debates may completely 
mislead the public because they will not be predicated on the public's 
full understanding of the relevant issues, which could have been 
assured by a thorough complementary debate on the Social Security 
tax. For example, if the past is any indication of the future, some 
politicians and commentators, who will disseminate through the press 
data or conclusions regarding the impact of our total tax package on 
various income classes, are certain to proceed on an unarticulated 
assumption-that the whole Social Security levy is a tax qua tax and, 
thus, a part of that package. That a portion of that levy, and thus a 
portion of the total package, more nearly resembles a price will have 
been ignored, and the public will have been misled. 
Finally, should Congress override Chairman Ullman's effort to 
postpone a more comprehensive revision of Social Security's financ-
ing arrangement and go on to address itself without scrupulous care 
to the merits of the President's plan, from that debate the public may 
not fully recognize a highly significant relationship between that plan 
and yet another proposed shortly thereafter by the President. Spe-
cifically, his formal May 9th Social Security proposal was followed 
on August 6, 1977, by an equally formal plan to revise the Welfare 
system that if enacted would in fact, though so disguised as not to 
do so pro f orma, by itself permanently convert the Social Security 
tax into a progressive levy. This aspect of the matter is discussed 
below. 
II. THE INCOME TAX: 
A WELFARE PROGRAM FOR THE POOR? 
Although this country remains committed to the free enterprise 
system, our substantial regulation of it to prevent abuse long has been 
complemented by devices designed to alter the income distribution 
generated by the marketplace. The most important such device grew 
out of our desire early in this century to gear each individual's share 
of the federal tax load to his ability to pay. To this end, we adopted 
in 1913 an income tax system under which, by hypothesis, one's share 
of the tax load would be affected by the amount of his income. Also 
included in our tax system was a specific bias, in the form of . 
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progressive rates, against larger incomes. That rate structure, which 
in 1913 began at one per cent and reached a marginal stated rate of 
six per cent on income exceeding $500,000 ultimately evolved over 
the years into the current rate pattern that begins at fourteen per cent 
and climbs to a marginal seventy per cent on income exceeding 
$200,000 in the case of a married couple filing a joint return. 
This rate structure will become a major issue in early 1978 when 
Congress deals with the administration's plan for income tax reform. 
One aspect of that issue will be the degree to which our current rate 
spread should be compressed, with the ceiling rate being reduced as a 
tradeoff for removing from the Code a variety of narrowly conceived 
tax preferences, such as special exclusions and certain deductions1 
that have been added in piecemeal fashion over the years. The 
prospects for such an endeavor will be evaluated later in this essay. 
However, before this Congress tries to reach a consensus on any 
given ceiling, it will be faced with-and perhaps will have resolved-
a related structural issue located at the opposite end of the income 
spectrum. 
As mentioned earlier, our first modem income tax act was deli-
berately shaped to include a bias against larger incomes in the form of 
a progressive rate structure. That same act simultaneously contained 
a preference in favor of lower incomes in the form of a substantial 
exemption deduction, designed primarily to shelter from the federal 
income tax all except those who were moderately well-to-do. Of an 
approximate population of 97 million, no more than 425,000 persons 
were expected to suffer any tax liability; and that estimate proved 
high, for fewer than 325,000 persons actually paid an income tax for 
the year 1913. 
A substantial preference of the foregoing type remained more or 
less intact for a quarter of a century. For example, in 1939 (the year 
Hitler launched World War II by invading Poland) only 4 million 
Americans, out of an estimated population of 130 million, had to pay 
a federal income tax. But when this country became involved in 
World War II, the need to raise additional revenue and to curtail the 
demand for consumer goods led to a sharp reduction in the exemp-
tion deduction. As a consequence, between 1939 and 1944 the 
number of income taxpayers increased tenfold. And from that now 
distant point in time through 197 6, not even all those living below the 
poverty line were completely sheltered from income tax liability, de-
spite congressional use of a variety of sheltering devices, such as the 
exemption deduction, standard deduction, and earned income credit. 
However, the administration-supported Tax Reduction and Simplifi-
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cation Act of 1977 did finally increase the standard deduction suffi-
ciently to reestablish a complete shelter at the poverty line. 
The 1977 act also extended for an additional year (through 
1978) an earlier recession-inspired temporary income tax change 
designed to shelter the poor from the adverse effects of yet another 
tax. In- making the large 1975 tax cut, Congress included a tempo-
rary refundable ten per cent earned-income-tax credit applicable to 
the first $4,000 of wages, the maximum $400 benefit decreasing by 
$1 for each $10 (ten per cent) of wages above $4,000, with $8,000 
in wages being the credit-termination point. The credit was allowed 
to working families with a child in the household, and a refund if 
no income tax was otherwise owing, for the purpose was to return 
to such families an amount roughly equal to the aggregate Social Se-
curity tax on their wages. Since the refunds were achieved under 
the income tax statute and were financed by general funds, not by 
Social Security taxes, the individual recipients continued to build up 
their Social Security rights. In effect, during that recession such 
families were not to suffer any "price" for their future anticipated 
pensions. 
Apart from the tax sheltering effect of the foregoing devices, 
governmental concern for the poor's welfare has otherwise shown up 
only on the expenditure side of the federal budget. But this may be 
altered during President Carter's second year in office. Both the ad-
ministration and the House Ways and Means Committee announced 
that before either begins to deal publicly with general income tax 
reform, each would take on that cluster of programs described by 
the President as the "welfare mess." Out of that total cluster, five 
major welfare programs account for spending of almost $40 billion 
annually by our various lev~ls of government. While the structure 
and thrust even of these five programs are well beyond the intended 
scope of this essay, criticisms abound and a brief recapitulation of 
these criticisms is essential to an understanding of the aims of the 
President's proposed solution and, more relevant here, the role tax 
ideas are to play to the end of altering further the income-distribu-
tion effects of our economy-in this case, to favor not only the poor 
but now also the "modest income working people hard hit by payroll 
tax increases [principally Social Security]." 
Administrative problems alone have proved troublesome to our 
welfare effort. For example, concern is expressed over the number 
of so-called welfare cheaters and also the number of bureaucrats 
required to administer, albeit unsuccessfully, these categorical and 
April-May 1977] Review of Tax Code 1295 
often overlapping programs geared to different eligibility require-
ments. 
Yet other criticisms focus on program substance. Now, except 
for the federally funded $5 billion annual food stamp program, each 
state unilaterally fixes and pays for the primary level of benefits these 
programs accord its residents, with the benefit levels varying widely in 
amount from state to state. Critics object that federal matching 
grants exacerbate these variations; as a result, average monthly 
benefits per family under the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) program varied in 1976 from $380.51 in New York to 
$47 .93 in Mississippi. Aside from these state-determined variations, 
other criticisms point simply to the general inadequacy of the pay-
ments themselves, to the consequent impact in the viability of af-
fected family units, and to the effect of both of these factors on the 
estimated three million minor children living in AFDC homes. In 
short, total funding is said to be inadequate, causing millions to live 
below an acceptable poverty line. Others charge that the programs, 
by focusing so significantly on unemployed AFDC mothers, tend to 
overlook the plight of the underemployed and even discourage their 
interest in part-time or low-paying employment. Some, moreover, 
are troubled by the psychological consequences of stigmatizing indi-
viduals as "welfare" recipients. Finally, yet others are bothered be-
cause several programs provide only benefits in kind (for example, 
food stamps and housing), thus depriving recipients of that freedom 
of choice now enjoyed by those of us fortunate enough to earn cash 
incomes. 
The President's proposed substitute--unveiled as recently as Au-
gust 6, 1977, and labeled a "Program for Better Jobs and Income"-
sprang from an integrated perspective of how our tax and expendi-
ture programs affect the economically disadvantaged. It includes 
features which provide additional though revised benefits for the 
poor as well as new benefits to those not poor but having only a 
"modest income." 
As to the poor, the program would consolidate three of the five 
major welfare programs (Aid to Families of Dependent Children, 
Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamp programs) into a 
single cash-assistance program somewhat in the nature of a negative 
income tax. National minimum standards would be established for 
both cash payments (which states could supplement) and more ex-
acting work requirements. Payments henceforth would be formally 
characterized either as a "Work Benefit" or as "Income Support," 
depending on the degree to which work (hopefully private employ-
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ment, but public service jobs if need be) was required in a given 
case. Program administration otherwise would be further stream-
lined in keeping with a strengthened federal role and with annually 
declining financial roles for state and local governments. 
According to this welfare-revision proposal, our positive-income-
tax law's present temporary refundable ten per cent credit on wages 
up to $4,000 would become a permanent feature for families having, 
as before, at least one child in the household. To this benefit, the 
President would add a further five per cent credit, allowable on earn-
ings ranging from $4,000 up to the point where a family, depending 
on its size, would become liable for federal income taxes (the so-
called tax entry point). The administration apparently expects that 
its own later submitted income-tax reform proposals will fix this en-
try point, for a family of four, at around $9,000. Thus, for that size 
of family, the maximum credit would exceed $600. However, at 
around $9,000, that family would begin to suffer a phaseout of $1 
for each $10 (ten per cent) of earnings in excess of that figure-
the declining credit thereafter terminating completely when wages 
reach $15,600. 
Since the original and also the currently asserted purpose of this 
credit was to cushion the impact of our "payroll tax" (Social Secu-
rity tax) on working families having relatively low incomes, the pro-
posed declining income tax credit is simply a device, and welfare 
revision is simply the occasion, for establishing what becomes tanta-
mount to a progressive Social Security tax, the rate varying depend-
ing on the amount of income. Progressivity in the Social Security 
tax results from the fact that this refundable credit declines propor-
tionately as income rises and is denied to the more economically ad-
vantaged members of the work force. Proportionately, the greatest 
benefit will be derived by the working poor having wages of $4,000 
or less; they will enjoy what is the equivalent of an almost complete 
refund of Social Security taxes (10 percentage points of the aggre-
gate 11. 7 percentage points paid by employers and employees), for 
otherwise they have no income tax liability. In all cases, however, 
future Social Security benefits would remain unaffected. 
In terms of replacing the three existing welfare programs which 
the President proposes to eliminate, the enlarged tax-credit arrange-
ment, though involving an additional annual cost of $3.3 billion (to-
tal cost, $4.8 billion) and benefiting 12 million additional families 
having relatively low or modest incomes, would still play only a rela-
tively minor role. Complementing it, at a total additional annual 
cost of $2.8 billion, would be a separately administered and much 
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larger cash assistance program ($20.7 billion in federal funds, plus 
state or local supplements). To assure feasibility of the latter's 
"work" requirements, a program of guaranteed public service jobs 
(full- and 'part-time, 1.4 million in number) and occupational train-
ing also has been budgeted, at a projected cost of $8.8 billion in 
federal funds. 
The cash assistance program would not be a pure negative in-
come tax. It includes other components, such as a work require-
ment keyed to variable standards. But otherwise, this proposed stat-
utory right to receive a minimum cash income, with the level being 
affected by family size and adjustep. further by an implicit rate ap-
plied to any wages received, does include the major features of a 
negative-income-tax preference. Thus, to that extent, it raises is-
sues strikingly similar to those which emerge when tax preferences 
are proposed for the positive side of the income tax ledger. 
Any consideration of tax preferences on either side of that ledger 
shoµld commence by answering three fundamental and cumulative 
questions: first, whether there is actually a societal problem; if so, 
second, whether the government should involve itself directly in try-
ing to solve it; and, if so, third, whether the government's contribu-
tion to resolving that problem can be made more equitably and effi-
ciently through a tax preference or -through some other means. 
That the poor do have a problem, and that the government 
should1 involve itself, are matters that were decided long ago-and 
correctly-during Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. President Car-
ter, on trying to think through the third question-i.e., whether a 
guaranteed cash assistance program (coupled with a work require-
ment applicable where feasible but determined by variable stan-
dards) would be both more efficient and equitable than three of our 
existing categorical programs-may well have been influenced by 
findings growing out of the government's own rather long-term ex-
periments with negative-income-tax plans. Several thousand fami-
lies, residing in six different geographical regions, have lived for sev-
eral years under diverse negative-income-tax arrangements, all to the 
end of providing data on their behavior. While some findings have 
been released, no doubt more will be disclosed during the coming 
debate. In any case, in the course of making a choice, the President 
necessarily had to deal with the almost inherent conflict which, in 
the setting of tax preferences, tends to exist between the twin goals 
of efficiency and equity. , 
Equity might seem to require that the program treat persons in 
like economic and family circumstances alike. Efficiency, by hy-
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pothesis, mandates that the nation's largess not be wasted by pay-
ments in mere substitution for other potential income. Further, 
equity and efficiency together require that persons in different eco-
nomic and family circumstances receive different amounts from the 
government. In other words, at some point and in some manner, 
it is necessary for the plan to take into account an otherwise eligible 
family's outside earnings. 
Should this not be done the plan would be inequitable and 
could waste the nation's resources. For example, to ignore com-
pletely all outside earnings would mean that, if the minimum 
amount guaranteed by the government is to be $4,200 for a family of 
four, such a family would have a right to receive the entire $4,200 
even if it had outside earnings of $4,199. On the other hand, to pay 
that family only the difference (one dollar) would be tantamount to 
imposing a one-hundred per cent tax rate on the $4,199 earned in 
the private sector. 
In responding to a roughly comparable problem when fixing our 
ordinary progressive rate pattern on positive income, conservatives are 
not alone in acknowledging that the imposition of a one-hundred per 
cent marginal ceiling rate on earned income in excess of $50,000 
would discourage a taxpayer from inconveniencing himself in any 
way to earn more than that $50,000. In short, given such a rate, the 
potential productivity of a taxpayer, and of America, might well 
suffer. Such a concern apparently prompted a supposedly liberal 
President, John F. Kennedy, to propose that our marginal ceiling rate 
of ninety-one per cent be reduced to its present seventy per cent. 
Subsequently, during former President Nixon's first term, this was 
reduced to fifty per cent in the case of personal service income. 
For similar reasons, President Carter, in shaping his financial as-
sistance program for persons economically disadvantaged, was disin-
clined to rely on psychological satisfaction alone to inspire the pro-
gram's beneficiaries to work and to try to climb out of the poverty 
class. In addition both to basic work requirements (imposed where 
deemed feasible, sometimes full-time, sometimes part-time) and to 
guaranteed accommodation of those requirements by public service 
jobs if need be, he provided positive economic incentives to work, 
in the private sector if possible, for all such persons. 
To provide such economic incentives, he concluded that cash 
grants should not be reduced by the entire amount of a beneficiary's 
other earned income. In other words, such outside earnings were 
not to be subject to the equivalent of an implicit positive one-hun-
dred per cent tax rate. Even now under the AFDC program, a moth-
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er's benefit payment is reduced only by sixty-seven per cent of each 
dollar earned in the private sector in excess of the first thirty dollars 
earned each month. However, a negative income tax does present a 
dilemma. If a sixty-seven per cent implicit rate (which allows the 
taxpayer to retain thirty-three per cent of his earnings plus the full 
guaranteed payment) will provide some inducement to work, even 
greater inducement and, thus, greater efficiency would be provided 
by imposing a lower implicit rate of fifty per cent. But to decrease 
the rate from sixty-seven to fifty per cent does intensify the conflict 
between efficiency and equity, in that identical amounts of aid would 
be paid to two families who otherwise have increasingly different 
gross income levels, and this could increase that share of the nation's 
allocated poverty funds paid to persons able, because of the plan it-
self, to live above the poverty line. In short, the plan could generate 
another type of inefficiency. 
To illustrate the foregoing, three assumptions are necessary: 
( 1) that the elimination of poverty is the sole objective; ( 2) 
that the poverty line exists at $6,000 for a family of four; and 
(3) that a guaranteed minimum income has been fixed at $4,200 for 
such a family. Assuming that a family is able to earn $5,600 in the 
private sector, imposition of a fifty per cent implicit rate would leave 
it with a net of $7,000 ($4,200 + $5,600 - [50% of $5,600]), 
$1,000 of which would be in excess of the $6,000 poverty line.4 If, 
in fact, the plan's overall efficiency does require a built-in incentive 
to work, it would be self-defeating by hypothesis to correct the pre-
viously illustrated inefficient deployment of $1,000 by substituting 
for the flat implicit rate on outside earnings a progressive implicit 
rate of the type used in our positive income tax. For example, sup-
pose we triggered a second tier implicit rate of one hundred per cent 
with respect to the $1,000 excess, would this not violate the original 
hypothesis by depriving the individual of any built-in incentive to 
crawl out of the poverty class and by encouraging him to continue 
to receive at least a net $400 guaranteed minimum payment? 
The point here is that, with a fifty per cent implicit rate, the ex-
cess $1,000 payment problem can be avoided altogether only by re-
ducing the guaranteed minimum to $3,000 (exactly fifty per cent 
of the assumed poverty line). But such a plan would also fall far 
short of eliminating poverty in the case of those without outside earn-
ings. 
4. Indeed, such a family, under a 50 percent implicit rate, could earn $8,200 in 
the private sector and still be entitled to receive $100 in negative income taxes. 
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The President, in that part of his program providing "Income 
Support" payments for the aged, the blind or disabled, and single 
parents of children under age fourteen, opted for a fifty per cent 
implicit rate and a basic federal benefit for four-member families 
of $4,200 ( calculated as follows: $1,900, plus $1,100 for the first 
child, and $600 for each additional child). In consequence, the ba-
sic benefit would not phase out completely until such a family's earn-
ings reached $8,400-a figure well above the poverty line. 
Before and after the presidential election, Mr. Carter stated that 
the federal government simply could not afford to assume the total 
cost of the entire welfare effort. In keeping with this admonition, 
his proposal would require states to pay ten per cent of the basic 
benefits paid to their residents (except where this figure exceeds 
ninety per cent of a state's previous welfare costs). States also could 
supplement that basic benefit. And in our example, the federal gov-
ernment would pay seventy-five per cent of the first $500 of any 
such supplemental benefit and twenty-five per cent of any additional 
amount up to the poverty line. 
But a state which provides supplements to "Income Support" re-
cipients also must supplement proportionally another class of federal 
cash payments called "Work Benefits." This type of benefit is to 
be paid to various persons-two-parent families, single people, child-
less couples, and single parents with no child under age fourteen-
who, although satisfying a full-time work requirement, still have in-
come deemed insufficient to support their families. Here the basic 
benefit for a family of four would be fixed at $2,300. A zero im-
plicit tax rate would be applied to the first $3,800 of outside earn-
ings, with a fifty per cent implicit rate applicable to any excess up 
to $8,400 of outside earnings. At this point, once again, the benefit 
would phase out completely. 
Designing both types of aid payments to meet the goals of equity 
and efficiency (by providing, simultaneously, existence-level support 
and also economically oriented work incentives) inescapably led to 
another controversy generating conflict between, and an impinge-
ment on, those same goals of equity and efficiency. While many 
unable to work will receive only bare subsistence-level "Income Sup-
port" payments, many others will receive some aid ("Work Bene-
fit") even though that assistance, plus their own earnings, enables 
them to live well above the poverty line. 
To accomplish a hierarchy among incentives, so as to provide a 
greater incentive for beneficiaries to seek work in the private sector 
rather than be content with public service jobs, the President would 
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further integrate his aid or negative tax program with our positive 
tax law. To this end he proposed that income earned in public serv-
ice jobs be ineligible for the enlarged earned income tax credit. 
Finally, equity alone theoretically might seem to require adjust-
ments from place to place in the dollar amount of the guaranteed 
minimum federal payments to take account of geographically caused 
disparities in the consumer price index. This effort, however, would 
be very complex, for an analysis of the consumer price index prob-
ably would show that substantial differences exist not just between 
New York and Mississippi, but also between urban and rural Missis-
sippi. In fact, the effort is so complex that, with respect to the posi-
tive income tax, successive Congresses have avoided a comparable 
political "hot potato" of mind-boggling complexity: neither the ex-
emption deduction nor the income brackets used in the progressive 
rate pattern have been adjusted to reflect their real worth in different 
geographical regions. However, the President's program may in 
fact, albeit not in form, at least roughly handle the underlying prob-
lem indirectly through the plan governing state supplements. States 
having a high cost of living are likely to provide the larger supple-
ments, and the cost of these supplements will be borne in part by 
federal funds. 
III. THE INCOME TAX: 
A "WELFARE PROGRAM FOR THE RICH"? 
The President, in concluding that our tax system was a "dis-
grace," reserved his sharpest criticism for the Code's large array of 
narrowly focused tax preferences in the form of special exclusions, 
deductions, credits, or rates. A 1976 study for the Senate Budget 
Committee, prepared chiefly by staff personnel working in the Con-
gressional Budget Office, estimated that the seventy-seven most 
widely recognized tax-preference provisions cost the Treasury, in the 
abstract, nearly $100 billion annually in lost revenue.5 Approxi-
mately three-fourths of that amount represents a reduction in the 
tax load of individuals, with the balance serving to reduce corporate 
taxes. 
With respect to individuals, except where the preference took the 
form of a credit, the effect was to shelter from a given taxpayer's 
highest marginal tax rate the amount of income that benefited from 
the preference. This helps explain why individual taxpayers with 
S. This figure assumes that, if each such preference were eliminated, taxpayer be-
havior would remain the same. 
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adjusted gross incomes of $50,000 or more are said to have saved, as 
a result of tax preferences, approximately twenty-three per cent of 
the $71 billion saved by all individual taxpayers, even though they 
represented only about 1.2 per cent of those filing a taxable return. 
No doubt these were among the considerations that prompted the 
President to describe the income tax law as a "welfare program for 
the rich." 
Much has been published, pro and con, about the rationale or 
substantive merits of these various preferences, viewed separately or 
together. The aim here is less substantive and merely provides an 
overview of the circumstances that brought us to this point, of the 
President's apparent aim to press for a major structural change that 
would elimihate the tax-preference approach to problem-solving, 
and of the obstacles he will face as he tries to undo the past. 
A. The Original Conception: To Tax Only the Rich 
The framers of our first income tax act, and most notably Repre-
sentative Cordell Hull, had no intention of creating what the Presi-
dent now describes as a "welfare program for the rich." Their inten-
tion was precisely the opposite. It was, in general, to apply progres-
sive rates to an income base that, except for a very large exemption 
deduction, was to include all "gains, profits, and income . . . of 
whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . . derived from any 
source whatever .... " In other words, as noted earlier, they in-
tended to establish "ability-to-pay" as the criterion and to protect 
completely from this tax not only the poor but also those not at least 
moderately well-off. Taxable returns were expected from less than 
0.5 per cent of the population. 
Within that small segment of the population, the framers did 
create tax preferences for certain limited types of economic activity. 
Having made the decision to allow a large standardized exemption 
deduction fixed as to amount to accommodate ordinary family expen-
ses, they logically decided to prohibit taxpayers from taking further 
account of "personal, living, or family expenses." As to a few 
circumstances, however, they were willing to make exceptions to this 
blanket prohibition. Two such exceptions, the deductions for non-
business taxes and for interest payments, then had the primary effect 
of encouraging home ownership. But, in contrast to their effective 
operation today, those provisions did not then discriminate against the 
poor or even against those moderately well off. Because of the large 
exemption deduction, these income groups were immunized com-
pletely from that tax. A third preference presumably rested on 
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equitable considerations. It allowed a deduction, in the case of non-
business property, for losses caused by "fire, storm, shipwreck or 
other casualty .... " Most such property was then, as is true now, 
acquired by using previously taxed income (after-tax savings). In-
voluntary conversion of such property means that, to the extent of 
his loss, the taxpayer-owner would never actually enjoy income on 
which previously he had paid a tax. Hence, a deduction was thought 
necessary "to square" matters. A fourth and final preference ex-
cluded interest derived from state and local bonds, apparently as a 
result of a widely held belief that such immunity was required by 
the Constitution. 
B. From Then to Now: Escalating Reliance on a 
Tax-Preference Approach to Problem Solving 
When referring to tax preferences, some politicians and commen-
tators, particularly when speaking through the popular press, often 
use the term "loopholes" and, by their manner and in the context of 
their remarks, imply that the origin of these can always be traced to 
influences that are at best tainted and at worst nefariously sinister. In 
fact, however, such inferences appear to be true in only a few 
instances, and even these have involved preferences of relatively little 
consequence-amounting almost to private bills. Some apparently 
were deliberately so well-disguised by deceptive language that their 
sponsors literally were able to slip them into the tax law without 
having to explain their real purpose to the taxpaying public. 
But not one of our major preferences has been so slipped into the 
statute. All of them can be traced, roughly speaking, to one of four 
other general sets of circumstances, only three of which are described 
here; the fourth is considered later. The most unusual of the four is 
illustrated in the origins of several Code provisions that, in combina-
tion, clearly defer tax on the undistributed profits of our now more 
than 30,000 controlled foreign subsidiaries. Given the Code's other-
wise worldwide reach, the deferral in question accords a tax prefer-
ence to American parent corporations that control those subsidiaries, 
with an annual revenue loss now exceeding $500 million. The 
legislative history of this statutorily created preference suggests that it 
is the completely unanticipated product of several otherwise fully 
justified tax provisions. That this actually could occur is, in context, 
quite understandable. The preference originated in our first income 
tax act (1913), whose congressional authors were neophytes in in-
come tax affairs. And at that time this country, then a debtor nation, 
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did not possess our now highly publicized $130 billion in foreign di-
rect industrial and commercial investments that would have drama-
tized for those early authors the tax consequence inadvertently con-
cealed by language primarily concerned with other factual circum-
stances. 
Exemplifying the second set of originating circumstances is an 
almost equally expensive preference that allows oil companies to 
deduct currently all intangible costs (such as wages, as distinguished 
from derricks and pipes) incurred in drilling a well even where it 
turns out to be a "wet" well that may produce profitably for many 
years. The distinctive nature of this second set of underlying circum-
stances is that Congress itself did not anticipate this specific factual 
problem; the preference resulted from a technical interpretation, in 
this instance by the Treasury, of undeniably sensible general statutory 
language, used deliberately by Congress to avoid having to deal 
specifically with every imaginable situation. Knowing what we do 
today, no doubt a contrary result would be reached by both the 
Treasury and the judiciary were that same precise technical or inter-
pretative question now to arise for the first time. But back in 1917, 
we did not know nearly as much as we do today about the useful lives 
of oil and gas wells. And in that now fairly distant past, the 
Treasury's published regulations permitted intangible costs to be 
subsumed under general statutory language allowing a full and imme-
diate deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred 
in carrying on any trade or business," instead of requiring that such 
costs be treated as capital expenditures and depreciated over the • 
estimated useful life of the well (as we do in the case of buildings). 
In the third situation, at the point a major preference began to 
wind its way through Congress, outside interested observers, as well 
as members of congressional tax-writing committees, knew very well 
that it was a preference that was being sponsored allegedly in the 
public interest. Because each such preference typically was ulti-
mately sponsored by one or both of the tax-writing committees, 
rather than by the appropriations committees, an earlier Chairman of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, while avoiding the term 
"loophole," acknowledged that they did represent a type of "back-
door spending." More recently, Congress itself, in developing new 
approaches to the total budgeting process, opted for the expression 
"tax expenditures." 
After enactment of the 1913 income tax act, the next use of the 
foregoing approach to societal problem solving involved the preferen-
tial deduction for contributions to charitable, educational, or religious 
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organizations. This idea originated in an editorial published in the 
New York Times shortly after our entry into World War I, at a time 
when Congress, to meet the then extraordinary high costs associated 
with that war, had just hiked the top marginal ceiling rate from six to 
sixty-seven per cent. The editorial expressed a fear that, because our 
people were not accustomed to such high progressive rates, the in-
creased load would tend to discourage taxpayers from continuing 
their generous financial support of private nonprofit organizations 
carrying on extremely important societal tasks. (Harvard University 
was singled out as an illustration of such an organization.) No doubt 
major institutions of that type and their supporters, who simultane-
ously were potential contributors and taxpayers, did what they could to 
assist the congressman who had the editorial published in the Con-
gressional Record and who successfully sponsored the enabling legis-
lation that authorized a charitable-contributions deduction. 
Three subsequent developments have contributed significantly to 
today's widespread and intense criticism of this tax-preference ap-
proach to societal problem solving. 
First, each administration and Congress has seen our nation 
encounter new societal problems and, beginning particularly with the 
administration of Franklin Roosevelt, has sought to provid~ a govern-
mental response. While new tax preferences were not the only weap-
ons available, typically a taxpayer-group ( often well-organized or 
at least well-represented in legislative halls) either was itself the 
societal problem or expressed interest in helping to attack the prob-
lem, but in either case such a group argued that it could not "go it 
alone" and that it required the aid of a new tax preference. The 
assistance also provided by every such group in facilitating congres-
sional enactment was no doubt also a factor in tempting each succeed-
ing administration-down to and including the administration of 
President Carter-to respond to problems by turning to just such a 
tax measure. It is hoped that a few examples, out of the many that 
might be cited, will emphasize the magnitude and seemingly inevitable 
character of this development. 
Franklin Roosevelt, concerned with the Great Depression, sought 
to improve· the nation's economic health by increasing consumer pur-
chasing power. To this end, he induced Congress inter alia to extend 
a tax preference to corporations but only as to distributed profits, in-
tending a significantly higher corporate rate for undistributed profits. 
It was also during his administration that the government addressed 
itself to the nation's health problems by adding to the tax code a 
special deduction for extraordinary medical expenses. 
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The Truman administration was marked, illustratively, by concern 
over the impact of the postwar era's skyrocketing prices on older 
persons who had retired or were about to retire from the labor force. 
Out of this concern emerged a tax preference doubling the personal 
exemption deduction for taxpayers or their spouses who had reached 
sixty-five years of age. 
President Eisenhower was in office when, to spur investment and 
invigorate a slow-moving economy, a provision for double-declining 
balance depreciation was added to the Code. 
But over the long haul, that apparently was not enough. By the 
time John F. Kennedy campaigned for office, our economy was 
again in the doldrums-a fact that led him to promise that he would 
take the steps necessary to "get America going again." To this end, 
his administration later pressed successfully for the adoption of an 
investment tax credit. 
President Johnson will be remembered, perhaps not only for our 
role in the Vietnam War, but also for his "Great Society" programs 
directed at the problems of the underprivileged. Not surprisingly, a 
special tax preference was granted employers during his administra-
tion to encourage them to hire and train welfare recipients. The 
preference took the form of a tax credit for part of the wages paid 
such persons. 
After Richard Nixon assumed office, the nation again suffered 
an economic slowdown and also a serious balance-of-payments prob-
lem. He responded in part by successfully urging Congress to adopt 
two new tax preferences: (1) the ADR system (asset-depreciation-
range system) to encourage business modernization and expansion; 
and (2) the DISC (domestic-international-sales-corporations) ar-
rangement to spur exports. 
Gerald Ford had just assumed the presidency when America 
suffered its most severe recession since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. He and Congress responded with the Tax Reduction Act of 
1975. To assist the sorely depressed housing industry, inter alia, it 
included a substantial tax credit for any taxpayer acquiring a new 
home. 
Finally, Jimmy Carter, though earlier quite generally critical of 
tax preferences, turned for help to such a preference soon after he 
took office, by urging Congress to increase the investment credit. 
Later, as the economy improved and after other features of his anti-
recession program had encountered widespread criticism in Congress, 
he abandoned this proposed increase in the investment credit. How-
ever, Congress responded by tacking on a job credit for employers 
adding new employees. 
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The foregoing examples are only illustrations of the important 
proposition stated earlier: each adminstrati.on and each Congress 
faced with societal problems has turned to tax preferences for assist-
ance. This important proposition must be kept before us during the 
ensuing discussion. 
Equally important to understanding the intense criticism directed 
at tax preferences, and closely related to the development just dis-
cussed, is the fact that each administration and each Congress has 
been almost consumed by the particular societal problems it encoun-
tered. As a consequence, no administration or Congress has ex-
pended much effort trying to determine whether previously adopted 
tax preferences should be retained. Thus, each such preference 
tended to remain a part of the Code regardless of whether the soci-
etal problem it originally addressed was still a significant problem, 
and if it were, whether that tax preference represented the most 
equitable, efficient, and feasible solution. It is true that the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976 did eliminate the fifty-year-old tax preference for 
China Trade Act corporations, but by 1976 only three taxpayers had 
any interest in its continued existence. The preference had certainly 
outlasted its usefulness. 
A final factor contributing to our dissatisfaction with tax prefer-
ences is that typically the annual revenue loss resulting from any 
given preference increases enormously in the years following its enact-
ment. For example, disregarding the constitutional issue, in the case 
of individuals the exclusion of interest from state and local bonds was 
relatively unimportant back in 1913 when tax rates ranged only from 
one to six per cent. Today, however, the top marginal rate is seventy 
per cent, and it should surprise no one that eighty-eight per cent of 
the resulting $1.3 billion annual revenue loss is attributable to indi-
viduals in high tax brackets having adjusted gross incomes of more 
than $50,000. In the case of corporations, given the almost flat 
forty-eight per cent stated rate imposed on most banks, the estimated 
revenue loss of $2.8 billion is even greater. 
Similarly, _in the first year following the 1921 enactment of the tax 
preferences now associated with private pension trusts, there were 
relatively few such trusts. But those provisions, designed to encour-
age the private sector to involve itself in the nation's retirement 
problems, have proved their effectiveness. Such trusts now hold over 
$200 billion in assets. But this tremendous growth also helps explain 
why the relevant tax preferences now result in an annual revenue loss 
of $6.5 billion. Finally, there probably was little employer-sponsored 
group life insurance in 1921 when the Internal Revenue Service first 
1308 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 7.S: 1286 
ruled that the annual benefit was excludible by covered employees. 
But today, group plans account for more than forty per cent of all life 
insurance. 
Taking into account literally dozens of comparable illustrations, 
tax preferences are now responsible for an estimated revenue loss of 
almost $100 billion, about three quarters of which is lost individual 
income tax revenue. 
C. President Carter Responds: 
Wholesale Attack on Preferences 
The foregoing developments on the tax side of the ledger have 
been matched, according to President Carter, by almost identical 
developments on the appropriations side. Congressional committees, 
concerned with appropriations, are said to have devoted almost all 
their time to questions involving increases requested by the various 
agencies, leaving scant time to examine whether any justification 
existed for previous funding levels. To reverse this trend and to force 
reexamination of the entire budget by reference to relative priorities, 
the President hopes to institute, with respect to all appropriations, a 
system of "zero-based budgeting." 
On the tax side, his stated intentions are identical. To say, as he 
has, that the nation must have "comprehensive, total tax reform," that 
we must "start from scratch rather than simply revise today's system," 
is simply another way of calling for "zero-based" review of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
His proposed guideline, substantively speaking, is to assure prog-
ressivity by taxing all income in the same way, but none of it more 
than once. Quite obviously, this is tantamount to a frontal attack on 
tax preferences. This accounts for his belief that, as a tactical matter, 
real reform will be possible only if the entire income tax law is "taken 
on" at one time, as a single package, "so that people [can] see a 
balance of where they might have to pay more in one area and get 
benefits [such as lower rates] in a different area." 
1. Obstacles in Carter's Path 
The qualities that made possible Mr. Carter's extraordinarily 
quick elevation from political obscurity to the oval office will be 
sorely tested ·when he seeks to overcome the six formidable obstacles 
that stand in the way of his proposed tax reform. 
The first difficulty results from the possibility that his "shotgun" 
may have too broad a gauge. Politicians and commentators who 
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refer to tax preferences as "loopholes" tend to create an impression 
that all tax preferences are equally devoid of merit. But on the day 
of reckoning (that is, when the votes are counted) they may discover 
that the impression they helped create has also entrapped them. 
Specifically, their failure to make distinctions and to concentrate their 
attack on the least meritorious may lead them to "take on" entirely 
too much. Meaningful differences do exist in at least the relative 
merits of the diverse preferences. For example, in respect to tax 
preferences associated with private pension trusts, the societal prob-
lem warranting concern (the provision of retirement income for the 
aged) relates exclusively to the very taxpayer group advantaged by 
the preference. They are one and the same. But it is otherwise in 
the case of deductions for gifts to ordinary charities. The basic aim 
here is to encourage preferenced taxpayers to donate substantially 
more than the value of their tax preference to organizations in which 
they possess no economic interest but which, according to congres-
sionally mandated standards, are performing important societal func-
tions for others. 
That there is a meaningful difference between these cases has 
even been acknowledged by the President. But his first problem goes 
beyond the fact that differences exist in the relative merits of tax 
preferences. More crucial is the fact that taxpayers and congressmen 
perceive important differences among the various preferences. Th9se 
varying perceptions no doubt are influenced by otherwise formulated 
ideological tastes; some persons, more readily than others, would use 
the income tax as a social tool to revise the income allocation patterns 
of the marketplace. As a consequence, a person of the former 
persuasion, while prepared to preserve the exclusion for Medicaid 
benefits (however substantial) received by a poor person, may none-
theless argue for elimination of the deduction for extraordinary medi-
cal expenses on the ground that it also benefits individuals in high 
rate brackets. In contrast, a second person less interested in politiciz-
ing the income tax may equate the two tax preferences. He could 
argue that both are warranted, since neither actually constitutes a 
"preference." He views "income"-the "base" or "subject" of the 
tax-as something potentially enjoyable. With respect to our two so-
called preferences, it is obvious that neither afflicted person really 
will "enjoy" the ·amounts in question; each case is roughly analogous 
to an involuntary conversion gener~ting a casualty loss. Our second 
observer, wishing to treat this loss according to his own conception of 
income, may be regarded by yet others as actually having done noth-
ing more than identify our fourth category of preferences, which 
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Congress justified by reference to equitable considerations. But the 
pivotal point-and one not to be thrust aside-is that, in the battle to 
eliminate preferences, it will not be easy to overcome previously 
conceived dispositions that led many persons (including congress-
men) to subscribe to the rhetoric housing those substantive argu-
ments supporting the original enactment of many preferences. 
A second obstacle, compounding the significance of entrenched, 
favorable perceptions, is the existence of vested interests. Enor-
mously powerful, sometimes different, sometimes overlapping, yet 
invariably articulate, taxpayer groups now benefit from one or more 
of our substantial preferences. For illustrative purposes only, con-
sider the following data: 
( 1) 90 million individual insurance policies now are included 
in the group life insurance policies taken out by employers for 
employees; 
(2) 32 million individuals, most of whom still are in the work 
force, are covered by preferentially treated private pension plans 
with total assets of more than $200 billion; 
(3) a comparable number, most of whom now have left the 
work force, currently benefit from the income tax exclusion for 
social security benefits; 
( 4) 9 million individuals, sixty-five years of age or older, file 
income tax returns claiming the second or additional exemption 
deduction granted exclusively to this age group; 
( 5) since sixty-four per cent of all housing units are owner-
occupied, it is not surprising that in one recent year 19.4 million 
returns listing itemized deductions included one for interest; 
(6) about 750,000 profitable corporations are sufficiently 
small to benefit substantially from the current $50,000 surtax 
exemption. 
Given the reality that vested interests in preferences are so widely 
spread across economic and age spectrums, and given the aggregate 
dollar amount involved in such preferences (individual and corporate 
preferences account for almost $100 billion annually), a successful 
campaign to eliminate them obviously requires that, as a quid pro 
quo, something be offered in exchange, even if our government 
immediately could effectively use (which it could not) all of the 
otherwise resulting revenue gain. The President in effect offered 
such a trade-off when he explained his reason for undertaking total 
tax reform in one package: "[l]f they only hear about the part that 
they'll pay more and don't hear ,about the compensating element of 
reduction in tax rates, that just creates consternation and concern, and 
it's a bad political thing to do." 
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But from this "compensating" offer will emerge a third and quite 
complex obstacle to his success, an obstacle that concerns the degree 
to which our current rate spread would be compressed, with the 
ceiling rate reduced. The complexity and formidable character of 
this problem result from the cumulative impact of several considera-
tions. The potential value of many such preferences (and thus the 
current tax saving) to specific individuals or income classes increases 
as their respective incomes and marginal rates increase. But to try to 
account for this in a compensating rate-reduction scheme would run 
headlong into the fact that there is no uniformity in the degree to 
which taxpayers within any given income class now avail themselves 
of these preferences. In short, no rate reduction, at least within limits 
tolerable to the treasury, 6 ever could satisfy all of any given income 
class. 
A fourth obstacle greatly intensifying the power struggle will 
emerge if there is an attempt to use the rate revision as an occasion to 
make-as the President has suggested-a relative change in the 
effective rates paid by the various income classes ( to achieve greater 
effective progressivity than presently exists). To refer to this prob-
lem first in terms of a power struggle is not to question the theoreti-
cally rational proposition that marginal rates for higher income brack-
ets must be higher than rates applied to lower income brackets even 
to achieve, in substance, a proportionate-rate tax (as distinguished 
from a progressive-rate tax). The utility value of a dollar to any 
given individual does decrease, perhaps even measurably, as the 
number of dollars available to him increases. But there probably is 
even more vitality in the iconoclastic view of the late Louis Eisenstein 
to the effect that, in congressional corridors, theoretically oriented 
rhetoric of this type can, at best, hope to play a role only after a pure 
power struggle has produced an agreed upon top marginal rate. Until 
that point is reached, the issue, in his view, is solely political, with its 
ultimate resolution a compromise--one that in effect has been forced 
on the diverse competing interests and that modifies through taxation 
the income distribution patterns otherwise generated by our eco-
nomic system. 
It will be difficult enough to reach a compromise on a new ceiling 
rate (simply in a trade-off for preferences) even if there is no 
intention to change the relative effective rates of the various income 
classes. In part, this will be due to a complementary proposal which 
6. To cut deeply enough to "buy off' everyone could either postpone some of Mr. 
Carter's planned programmatic changes or neutralize bis efforts to balance the budget 
by the end of bis first term. 
1312 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1286 
probably will be submitted by the President, to eliminate the so-
called double tax on distributed corporate profits. I have analyzed 
elsewhere the purposes and ramifications of this proposal, 7 which 
former President Ford's treasury secretary had first proposed to in-
terested congressional committees. Relevant for our purposes, how-
ever, is this question: if the enactment of such a proposal is assumed 
to constitute a benefit primarily for higher income classes, should 
this assumed benefit affect ( that is, reduce) the amount of individual 
rate reduction that otherwise would be offered in exchange for vari-
ous preferences; or should it be used in exchange for the elimination 
of existing preferences at the corporate level (such as the investment 
credit that alone saved corporations almost $7 billion in 1976); or 
should it be deemed warranted without exacting for it any pound 
of flesh, the theory being-as the President once said-that it simply 
is not "right" to tax income twice? 
The formidable character of the complexities presented in just 
choosing among these three alternatives can be demonstrated by one 
example. Should it be decided to eliminate entirely the preferential 
investment credit in a trade-off for President Carter's proposed elimi• 
nation of the "double taxation" of corporate profits, what is to be 
done to pacify those among our 11 million single proprietors who do 
not own shares, and thus will not benefit from Mr. Carter's comple• 
mentary proposal, but who would lose their share of the $1.5 billion 
in investment credits that individuals claimed in 1976? 
The foregoing difficulty will be encountered even if the overall 
compromise is intended generally to maintain the existing relative 
effective tax loads borne by the various income classes. But should 
the President seek, as he has implied, to change the relative effective 
burdens of the diverse classes, the justifying consideration to which he 
points is certain to be challenged. The President's attitude and the 
reason for his proposed change was indicated by the following 
statement: "The present tax structure is a disgrace to this country. 
It's just a welfare program for the rich. As a matter of fact, 25 per 
cent of the total tax deductions go for only one per cent of the richest 
people in the country."8 The data used by the President were 
roughly correct. But his conclusion, that the tax is a "welfare 
program for the rich," is at least questionable. He did not mention 
that, even with all the preferences, the 1.2 per cent of our taxpayers 
having adjusted gross incomes exceeding $50,000 (presumably the 
1. See Wright, supra note 2, at 914. 
8. Emphasis added. 
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one per cent class to_ which he referred) did, nevertheless, pay ap-
proximately eighteen per cent of all individual income taxes. 0 
A fifth and distinctively different obstacle facing any wholesale 
attack on preferences grows out of the substantial degree to which our 
economy and various preferences of long duration have become 
inextricably interwoven, together shaping not only economic relation-
ships but our economic life, so that pulling out the preference threads 
could unravel much of the fabric. For example, labor unions and 
management long have bargained collectively over the merits of 
diverse types of fringe benefits as substitutes for take-home pay. The 
bargaining process took account not only of business purposes and 
family needs but also of the existing relative after-tax cost of the two 
to both employers and employees. The end result, set out in thou-
sands of labor contracts, has become an accepted part of our eco-
nomic life. To unravel this existing pattern, accepted by labor as well 
as management, would not be easy. By the same token, loss (or cur-
tailment) of the preferential interest deduction obviously would pre-
9. Also, looking only at preferences extended directly to individuals, the resulting 
tax savings to them appear to be spread across the various income classes in a manner 
more proportionate to each income class' actual proportion of the total income tax 
load than might be supposed on reading only comments in the popular press. 
The following schedule includes in each column the relevant date most recently 
available to this writer. 
Estimated Percentage Of 
Total Total dollar Total individual 
Adjusted gross taxable value of income taxes 
income class (AGI) returns preferences paid 
(dollars) (1974) (1976) (1973) 
0- 7,000 29.7% 9.37% 5.64% 
7,000-15,000 40.9% 22.07% 28.36% 
15,000-50,000 28.2% 41.77% 48.05% 
50,000 and over 1.2% 23.07% 17.96% 
While the above figures show the percentages of the four adjusted gross income 
classes falling under the three listed categories-total taxable returns, total dollar 
value of tax preferences, and total income taxes paid (the use of differing years 
being forced by the absence of complete data)-each such percentage is less than 
totally accurate. 
The inaccuracy results from the fact that AGI does not include all of the items 
which would be included under a fully comprehensive definition of income. Illustra-
tively, long-term capital gains typically are reduced by one-half before their inclusion 
in AGI. Further, in 1976, some United States citizens living or working abroad were 
able to exclude up to $25,000 in overseas earnings from AGI, causing them to fall 
in a lower AGI class although their salaries tended to range upward from $20,000. 
Again, a man aged 65 or over and with a spouse aged 65 or over, retiring in 1976 
and entitled to the maximum benefits then payable under Social Security, would have 
been able to exclude from his AGI $6,552 of those benefits. Should this retired 
worker also have been receiving a noncontributory pension and/or any income from 
past savings, he would have had an AGI of $6,552 less than would have been the 
case were Social Security benefits includible. 
Obviously further illustrations can be cited. For a general, albeit brief, dis-
cussion, see SEN. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, TAX ExPENDITURES: COMPENDWM OF 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 4 (March 17, 1976). 
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elude homeowners from using it to cut their tax and housing costs. 
And there would be a further side effect since the increased cost 
of owning a home would reduce its market value vis-a-vis that of a 
bond. Further, homeowners would not be alone in valuing the pref-
erential deductions for nonbusiness interest and taxes; their opinion 
of this "subsidy" is no doubt shared by the hundreds of thousands 
of persons associated with the troubled housing industry. Indeed, 
aid to that industry was the precise reason why, in 1975, Congress 
granted a new one-shot tax preference-a substantial credit-to in-
dividuals purchasing new homes. 
The point, more generally stated, is this: if Congress contem-
plates eliminating a preference that indirectly also benefits important 
interests other than those preferenced taxpayers, must it-both as a 
tactical matter and in order to handle a potential societal problem-
be prepared to present simultaneously an alternative nontax program 
to accommodate the concerns of those other important interests? For 
example, will hospitals, in addition to directly affected taxpayers, 
require assurance that there will be a National Health Insurance 
program before they abandon their support for the existing tax pref-
erences individuals enjoy with respect to health insurance (whether 
employer sponsored or otherwise)? 
An affirmative answer to this general question would exacerbate 
beyond all reason a sixth obstacle that, even if it were standing alone, 
would constitute a sufficiently formidable obstacle to comprehensive 
tax reform. This sixth obstacle concerns the method and the time 
frame by which such reform is to be pushed through Congress. A 
senior White House aide has stated that the President's comprehensive 
reform bill will be submitted in late 1977, about one year after the 
President's assumption of office. The mere possibility that he then 
might expect Congress to be equally prompt in processing that pro-
posal and in enacting a new Code (for instance, by late 1978) is 
alone sufficient to dramatize the awesome impact of method and time 
frame on attempts to achieve "comprehensive" tax reform. 
Generally speaking, there are only two possible approaches in 
Congress, though each can be compromised to one degree or another. 
The first, buttressed by the Carter imprimatur, is the single-package 
approach. The other is a staggered approach, proposed several years 
ago by Wilbur Mills, former Chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee. Under the latter, -all tax-preference provisions would be 
divided into groups, with final action on each group (termination, 
revision, or reenactment) taking place intermittently in succeeding 
years according to a predetermined time schedule calling for comple-
tion of the entire task in a fixed number of years. 
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With respect to the President's plan to submit a single package in 
late 1977, assume that otherwise fairly knowledgeable but busy 
policymakers within the executive branch are able during Mr. Cart-
er's first year to absorb intelligently not only the essential economic 
data, but also the social and political nuances unavoidably relevant in 
choosing from among competing substantive alternatives that, taken 
as a whole, must coincide at least with the boundaries of the 
present income tax. Assume also that within the same year, lawyers 
experienced in tax affairs will be able to produce a sufficiently 
understandable draft at least to warrant its submission to the tax-
writing congressional committees. At this point, the first of three 
serious difficulties will begin to emerge. Is it realistically possible 
for those committees, to which many new members have recently 
been assigned, to respond intelligently and responsibly to a single 
package having such enormously complex, interdependent, and wide-
ranging ramifications and dimensions? Consideration of this ques-
tion identifies the first problem, which is exacerbated by the fact that 
each committee will have before it not just the President's proposal 
but also alternative plans. 
And what about the Congress itself, once the committees file their 
majority and minority reports? To understand the plight of individ-
ual congressmen and senators, it is necessary to make just two points. 
If the reader is wearied by this short essay (which merely raises 
questions without answering them and which illustrates each with a 
single example, ignoring a multitude of others equally troublesome), 
how can a congressman or senator be expected within a relatively 
short time to "get on top of the whole subject" to the extent required 
for him to respond intelligently and responsibly to a single package 
embracing total tax reform? 
But political life being what it is, many congressmen and senators 
will no doubt conclude that the foregoing difficulty is the least of their 
problems. Many will feel that, whatever pressures are exerted in 
Washington, they simply cannot vote until after their own constituen-
cies-to whom they are ultimately responsible-have developed the 
type of understanding essential to providing intelligent "feedback" 
(voter reaction). 
The mind-boggling difficulties encountered in trying simulta-
neously to educate sufficiently both the public and Congress concern-
ing the potential effects of any total tax reform proposal (on each of 
them individually and on the nation as a whole) would, it is true, be 
minimized by Mr. Mills' staggered approach to the problem. But it 
raises another difficulty, at least equally awesome, which the Presi-
dent understandably is most anxious to avoid. 
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The principal difficulty with the staggered approach becomes self• 
evident upon examining the ill-fated Tax Policy Review Bill of 1972 
in which Mr. Mills embodied his proposal. Its aim was to assure that 
all preferential provisions would be reexamined carefully and man-
ageably-with one-third coming up for review each year. This 
approach would insure that all relevant arguments would still be fresh 
in the minds of congressmen and the public at the time Congress 
acted on any given set of preferences. One corollary to this approach 
necessitates the division of all preferential provisions into three 
groups. But Mills'-or anyone else's-groupings would have an 
inherent defect. If Congress did legislate following its study of the 
first group, it would find itself buying a "pig in a poke," and, as Mr. 
Carter so clearly recognizes, this will be true however the various 
provisions are grouped. This is the inescapable consequence of the 
exceptionally pluralistic and complex character of our society. The 
tax affairs of individuals or business enterprises have become inter-
twined in diverse ways and degrees with many Code provisions in-
cluding those according various types of preferences. As a conse-
quence, under the staggered approach, regardless of how the prefer-
ential provisions are grouped, there is great risk that congressmen 
(and the public) will conclude that, because of the overriding im-
portance of the tax reform's total effect, they simply must not vote 
affirmatively on changes proposed for the first group without know-
ing precisely what will be done to the provisions included in the 
other two groups, on which work and action have been deferred. 
Thus, under this method, there may be even less assurance than un-
der the President's single-package approach that any total tax reform 
can be achieved, though both methods would be encumbered by the 
first five previously described obstacles. 
Mr. Mills' earlier bill, to assure that Congress in fact would 
carefully reexamine all preferences according to the predetermined 
time schedule (over a three-year period), would have applied auto-
matic repealers-staggered over the three-year period-to each item 
in each group. The underlying supposition was that Congress, with 
this gun at its head, was certain to act, one way or another. Predict-
ably, the business community argued that the consequent threat, be-
cause of its unsettling effect, would immediately adversely affect 
business confidence regarding the future business (including tax) 
climate.10 
10. Representative Ullman, now the Ways and Means Committee Chairman, re-
sponded to this criticism at that time by proposing that the automatic repealer be 
eliminated, accompanied by a congressional directive to the tax-writing committees 
to complete their study in a two-stage approach (rather than three) over a two-year 
period. 
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For reasons cited elsewhere, the President has now opted for the 
single-package approach to reform. But whatever Congress now does 
in connection with that effort, the Senate Operations Committee 
proposes that thereafter, through its "Sunset Bill," all "tax expendi-
ture" provisions be subjected to termination dates selected to coincide 
with the scheduled periodic reexamination of their functional counter-
part programs on the "direct expenditure" side of the ledger. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Within just one term, President Carter proposes to move from the 
greatest annual deficit in history to a balanced budget, to reorganize 
the entire government, to institute National Health Insurance, to 
revamp the entire welfare program, to deal with the energy problem, 
and to "zero base" not only all appropriations, but also the Internal 
Revenue Code. Obviously, he is not a timid man (to whom "ever-
thing is impossible"). 
It also is true that each of those things needs to be done. 
But contemplating only his proposed wholesale revision of the tax 
code and understanding the formidable obstacles to intelligent total 
tax reform, some of his critics no doubt will conclude that, precisely 
because he opted for the "impossible," for the "pie in the sky," 
Congress may well wind up having to follow the advice of the late 
Rudyard Kipling: "stick to the Devil you know." 
But his critics may be wrong. His unusual rise from relative 
obscurity to the Presidency-against "impossible" odds-demon-
strates, does it not, that, in addition to lacking timidity, he clearly is 
no fool (one who rushes "in where angels fear to tread"). 
